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LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE ‘IDEALISTIC STUDENT’: USING FOUCAULT 
TO UNPACK THE CRITICAL LEGAL NARRATIVE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
It appears that few of the students holding ‘socially idealistic’ goals upon entering law 
school actually maintain these upon graduation. The critical legal narrative, which 
explains and seeks to act upon this shift in the graduate’s ‘legal identity’, posits that 
these ideals are repressed through power relations that create passive receptacles into 
which professional ideologies can be deposited, in the interests of those advantaged 
by the social and legal status quo. 
 
Using the work of Michel Foucault, this paper unpacks the assumptions underpinning 
this narrative, particularly its arguments about ideology, power, and the subject. In 
doing so, it will argue this narrative provides an untenable basis for political action 
within legal education. By interrogating this narrative, this paper provides a new way 
of understanding the construction of the legal identity through legal education, and a 
new basis for political action within law school. 
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I INTRODUCTION: THE ‘IDEALISTIC’ LAW STUDENT 
 
The attitudes, values, and mental health and wellbeing of law students as they 
progress through university legal studies are regular concerns within legal education 
scholarship. Much research in this area focuses on the motivations that law students 
have for studying law. Although many students find intellectual stimulation in the 
law, or are concerned with gaining fulltime employment and living comfortably, some 
studies have identified that a number of students, upon graduation, hope to practise 
law in the public interest, or that they are studying law for other reasons that could be 
broadly defined as ‘socially idealistic’, such as fighting for social justice, or 
addressing social disadvantage.1 
 
However, what is apparent from many of these studies is that legal education does not 
foster these social ideals. Consequently, relatively few of these ‘idealistic students’ go 
on to actually pursue these aims in legal practice: as Schleef notes, ‘the trend away 
                                                 
1 Judy Allen and Paula Baron, ‘Buttercup goes to Law School: Student Wellbeing in Stressed Law 
Schools’ (2004) 29 Alternative Law Journal, 285, 286; Tracey Booth, ‘Student Pro Bono: Developing a 
Public Service Ethos in the Contemporary Australian Law School’ (2004) 29 Alternative Law Journal, 
280, 281; Jeremy Cooper and Louise Trubek, ‘Social Values from Law School to Practice: An 
Introductory Essay’ in Jeremy Cooper and Louise Trubek (eds), Educating for Justice: Social Values 
and Legal Education (1997) 1, 14; Debra Schleef, ‘“That’s a Good Question!”’: Exploring Motivations 
for Law and Business School Choice’ (2000) 73 Sociology of Education 155, 157; Julian Webb, 
‘Developing Ethical Lawyers: Can Legal Education Enhance Access to Justice?’ (1999) 33 The Law 
Teacher 284, 285-6. 
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from a social justice orientation while in law school has been widely documented’.2 In 
fact, research continues to show that many students become vocationally oriented and 
cynical about the ability of the law to achieve social change, or experience alienation 
and silencing,3 or more extreme problems with their mental and physical health (such 
as a decline in life satisfaction and wellbeing, or, as a recent Australian study by the 
Brain and Mind Research Institute attests, the development of depression).4 
 
For some legal education scholars, the suggestion that law school results in the loss of 
social idealism by students has motivated them to study the effect that legal education 
has on the law student’s ‘legal identity’ – that is, their political consciousness, their 
knowledge of the law, and the lens through which they view the role of the law in 
society. In this sense, a major concern of these researchers (in fact Schleef describes it 
as their ‘Holy Grail’)5 has been to understand why law students, upon graduation, take 
jobs in corporate practice despite entering legal education with ‘altruistic aspirations 
                                                 
2 Schleef, above n 1, 157. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Sheldon and Krieger cited in Allen and Baron, above n 1, 285-6. As Allen and Baron state, legal 
education has a ‘deleterious effect’ on law students. See also Norm Kelk, Georgina Luscombe, Sharon 
Medlow and Ian Hickie, Courting the Blues: Attitudes Towards Depression in Australian Law Students 
and Lawyers (2009) Brain and Mind Research Institute 
<http://cald.anu.edu.au/docs/Law%20Report%20Website%20version%204%20May%2009.pdf> at 16 
July 2009; Ruth McKinney, ‘Depression and Anxiety in Law Students: Are We Part of the Problem 
and Can We Be Part of the Solution?’ (2002) 23 Journal of the Legal Writing Institute, 55. 
5 Schleef, above n 1, 157. 
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geared toward public service’.6 Scholars have suggested a range of explanations 
regarding how and why this loss of idealism occurs, and have often suggested how the 
situation may be altered so that students can maintain their social idealism. 
 
This paper is concerned with unpacking and interrogating one approach to explaining 
this issue – that posited by critical legal scholars. Although the predominantly US-
based Critical Legal Studies ‘movement’ (which brought this issue – and other critical 
debates – to the fore within the field of legal education) is generally considered to 
have waned, exploring this critical scholarship in the way this paper does remains an 
important and relevant task for two reasons. 
 
Firstly, there exists a gap in the way legal education is theorised and conceptualised in 
the academic literature. Many scholars that were aligned with this critical movement 
have pushed their analyses of the law past these critical arguments, often by using the 
work of Michel Foucault, who provides effective tools for this task. However, this 
intellectual trajectory has not occurred to the same extent within legal education 
research. Only a handful of scholars have used Foucault’s work to examine legal 
education (both in Australia and overseas), and none have explicitly done so to 
problematise the arguments produced by critical scholarship.7 Therefore, this paper 
provides a basis for addressing this gap in research and theory. 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 Of course the work of other post-structural thinkers can be used for this task, however given 
Foucault’s work is directly concerned with pushing past critical analyses, his work will constitute the 
focus of this paper. For a discussion of the dissipation of critical legal scholarship, see Pierre Schlag, 
  5 
 
Secondly, as suggested by recent empirical studies and the developing interest in the 
mental health of law students discussed above, the loss of idealism and social justice 
orientations in law students remains an important concern of legal educators. 
However, as the dominance of critical scholarship has dissipated, so too have strongly 
politicised understandings of the construction of the legal identity. The studies 
mentioned above focus on student mental health or the pedagogy of legal education, 
and offer comparatively little to those wanting to understand the power relations and 
discourses or ideologies involved in shaping a legal identity. Thus, in some instances, 
the conceptual frameworks and domain assumptions of critical scholarship continue to 
                                                                                                                                            
‘U.S. CLS’ (1999) 10 Law and Critique, 199, 204-209. For an introduction to scholarship using 
Foucault’s work to examine the law, see Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a 
Sociology of Law as Governance (1994); Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s Law (2009); 
and the essays collected in Gary Wickham and George Pavlich (eds), Rethinking Law, Society and 
Governance: Foucault’s Bequest (2001). For studies into legal education using Foucault’s work, see 
further,  Margaret Thornton, Dissonance and Distrust: Women in the Legal Profession (1996); 
Nickolas James, ‘Expertise as Privilege: Australian Legal Education and the Persistent Emphasis Upon 
Doctrine’ (2004) 8 University of Western Sydney Law Journal 1; Nickolas James, ‘Liberal Legal 
Education: The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality’ (2004) 1 University of New England Law Journal 
163; Nickolas James, ‘Power-Knowledge in Australian Legal Education: Corporatism’s Reign’ (2004) 
40 Sydney Law Review 587; Nickolas James, ‘The Good Law Teacher: The Propagation of 
Pedagogicalism in Australian Legal Education’ (2004) 27 University of New South Wales Law Journal 
147; Nickolas James, ‘Why Has Vocationalism Propagated So Successfully in Australian Law 
Schools?’ (2004) 6 University of Notre Dame Law Review 41; Vanessa Munro, ‘The Discipline of Law 
– Legal Education at the Intersection of the Juridical and the Disciplinary’ (2003) 2 Journal of 
Commonwealth Law and Legal Education 31. 
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be the only explanatory tools that inform politicised understandings of legal 
education. Examining critical scholarship as this paper does offers an original way of 
conceptualising and researching issues such as power and the shaping of the legal 
identity, without repeating the claims or relying on the assumptions of critical 
scholarship. Additionally, it can provide some of the groundwork for new forms of 
activism and engagement in law school for those seeking to foster student idealism. 
 
It must be noted that the explanations that critical scholars have posited for the loss of 
student idealism, and as presented here, do not necessarily cohere into one 
overarching unified explanation. However, critical approaches often work from 
common assumptions, and adopt similar narrative elements in forming their 
explanations – in this sense, critical approaches tell a similar ‘story’ about legal 
education. This general story will be referred to here as the ‘critical legal narrative’.8 
 
Simply put, this narrative suggests that the legal profession exercises power over the 
law curriculum so as to ideologically indoctrinate students and desensitise them to 
concerns for social justice, allowing them to take up a position of power as a legal 
professional within the current social and political order, and subsequently not 
challenge the status quo. This is said to be the result of both an explicit attempt to 
                                                 
8 Importantly, this is not intended to essentialise or simplify this narrative. Critical scholarship has 
always been constituted by a diverse array of scholars generally united only by their desire to critically 
examine the operation of the law. See Schlag, above n 7, 202. The term ‘narrative’, in the singular, is 
used here simply to refer to the widespread and general themes and orientations underpinning these 
critical analyses. It is not intended to be representative of what all critical scholars argue. 
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indoctrinate students, as well as simply a consequence of the arrangement of 
classroom practices. The critical narrative has also informed many attempts to alter 
this situation, such as the introduction of a critical legal education. However, although 
some of these attempts are quite widespread and pervasive within legal education, 
they are by no means the dominant educational approach to legal education. 
Furthermore, where they have been implemented, these attempts have not been widely 
adopted, nor have they always been successful.9 Again, unpacking the critical 
narrative and investigating it using new conceptual tools such as those provided by 
Foucault’s work offers new opportunities to alter the practices of legal education. 
 
This paper (along the lines of other Foucaultian research that examines critical 
scholarship) suggests that the failure of the critical legal narrative to completely alter 
legal education and prevent the development of cynicism within students may be 
related to some of the assumptions underpinning this narrative. In particular, the 
critical narrative relies on assumptions about knowledge and indoctrination, the 
operation of power, and the role of the subject within legal education that must be 
unpacked so that this narrative can be critically understood.10 
                                                 
9 See for example Schlag, above n 7, 204-209. This is also evidenced by recent studies that demonstrate 
that law students still experience alienation and silencing and depression. See for example, Allen and 
Baron, above n 1; Schleef, above n 1; Kelk et al, above n 4. 
10 In addition, this narrative unproblematically takes the ‘loss’ of social idealism as a phenomenon that 
can be objectively known and understood. This paper recognises that, instead, a student’s social 
idealism is an object of knowledge constructed through discourses. It has been discussed here simply as 
a way of identifying that power relations exist within legal education and that these govern students. 
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As mentioned above, the work of Foucault, particularly his approaches to 
understanding knowledge, power, and the subject, provides effective tools with which 
to unpack the critical narrative and consider its base assumptions. Thus, his work will 
be used to do so here. It must be noted that this paper is primarily concerned with 
using Foucault’s work to bring to light these assumptions, and not to construct an 
alternative explanation for the ‘loss’ of student idealism using these concepts. It is 
also not possible here to articulate how Foucault’s work can be used to inform and 
direct future research that might build on the implications of this discussion.11 Instead, 
this paper lays the groundwork for the further use of Foucault’s tools and concepts 
(and those of others engaged in similar endeavours) as a direction for future legal 
education research and action that offers a different way of thinking about the 
construction of the legal identity, and may ensure that political action in legal 
education remains effective. 
 
II EXPLAINING THE LOSS OF IDEALISM: THE CRITICAL LEGAL NARRATIVE 
 
The critical legal narrative emerged from an historical context specific to many 
Western nations. It developed from a broader body of legal thought, and germinated 
                                                 
11 Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’ in particular can be used in this context to move beyond the 
critical legal narrative, however an exploration as to how this may occur is beyond the scope of this 
paper. For broad introductions to Foucault’s thought, see generally Sara Mills, Michel Foucault (2003); 
Clare O’Farrell, Michel Foucault (2005). For an introduction to the concept of governmentality, see 
generally Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (2nd edition, 2010). 
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in the political ferment of the 1960s and 1970s that was seeking an end to the Vietnam 
War, the recognition of women’s rights, racial equality, and sexual liberation. Many 
legal scholars (including those as diverse as radical post-Marxists and postmodern 
legal theorists) continue to share these aims. They generally seek to challenge the 
claims of the law to neutrality and objectivity, and subject the operation of the law to 
critical scrutiny so as to demonstrate the disadvantageous effects that it can have on 
minority social groups.12 Underpinning these critical views of the legal system are 
notions of social justice, and the desire to develop a more just and egalitarian world.13 
According to the Critical Legal Conference:14 
The central focus of the critical legal approach is to explore the manner in 
which legal doctrine and legal education and the practices of legal 
institutions work to buttress and support a pervasive system of oppressive, 
                                                 
12 Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Critical Legal Education’ (1988-89) 5 Australian Journal of Law and Society, 
27, 32; Peter Fitzpatrick & Alan Hunt, ‘Critical Legal Studies: Introduction’ in Peter Fitzpatrick & 
Alan Hunt (eds), Critical Legal Studies (1987) 1; Alan Hunt, ‘The Critique of Law: What is ‘Critical’ 
about Critical Legal theory?’ in Peter Fitzpatrick & Alan Hunt (eds), Critical Legal Studies (1987) 5; 
Gerry Simpson & Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Objecting to Objectivity: The Radical Challenge to Legal 
Liberalism’ in Rosemary Hunter, Richard Ingleby, & Richard Johnstone (eds), Thinking About Law: 
Perspectives on the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Law (1995) 86; Allan Hutchinson, 
‘Introduction’ in Allan Hutchinson (ed), Critical Legal Studies (1989) 1; Ian Ward, An Introduction to 
Critical Legal Theory (2nd ed, 2004) 144; Jíří Příbáň, ‘Sharing the Paradgims? Critical Legal Studies 
and the Sociology of Law’ in Reza Banaker and Max Travers (eds), An Introduction to Law and Social 
Theory (2002) 119; Schlag, above n 7, 202; Christopher Stanley, ‘Training for the Hierarchy? 
Reflections on the British Experience of Legal Education’ (1988) 22 The Law Teacher 2, 78. 
13 Hutchinson, above n 12, 3; Příbáň, above n 12, 119. 
14 Cited in Fitzpatrick and Hunt, above n 12, 1-2. 
  10 
inegalitarian relations. Critical theory works to develop radical alternatives, 
and to explore and debate the role of law in the creation of social, economic 
and political relations that will advance human emancipation. 
 
By demonstrating the political interests enshrined and reflected in legal institutions, 
the ultimate purpose of critical legal theorising (in whatever form it takes) is to effect 
social change, political reform, and even revolution. Critical scholars hope that by 
providing a critical analysis of social and legal institutions (including legal education) 
they can open up avenues through which structures of power may be overcome.15 
 
Many critical legal scholars see legal education as a central site through which 
students are provided messages about the law that perpetuate disadvantageous social 
relations. Therefore they take it as an appropriate target for research and political 
intervention.16 The explanations that critical scholars have developed in their attempts 
to understand the loss of idealism within students are intended to ‘demystify’ law 
school, ‘free’ students from a ‘false necessity’ and ‘arm or at least shield [politically] 
left law students from the conservatising effects of law school training’.17 As will be 
discussed below, it is generally argued that it would be politically inconvenient for 
those advantaged by the structure and operation of the law if law schools produced 
                                                 
15 Příbáň, above n 12, 121 and 125. 
16 Hunt, above n 12, 6; Příbáň, above n 12, 126 and 130; Martin Tsamenyi and Eugene Clark, ‘An 
Overview of the Present Status and Future Prospects of Australian Legal Education’ (1995) 29 The 
Law Teacher 1, 7. 
17 Schlag, above n 7, 203. 
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graduates who understand these structures and are motivated to change them. As a 
result, students entering law school with social ideals have these ideals ‘repressed’, or 
at the very least, they are not encouraged to engage with content that could foster their 
ideals, and therefore subsequently lose such motivations. As it forms the basis of this 
paper, the critical legal narrative that scholars use to explain how this occurs must be 
outlined in more detail. 
 
A The Content of the Law Degree and Ideological Indoctrination 
 
The major focus of critical scholars has been the content of the law curriculum and the 
knowledge students are taught. The assumption is that this content is central to 
governing the construction of the legal identity and the loss of idealism. The critical 
narrative suggests that it is as a corollary of the influence of the legal profession over 
legal education that the law curriculum overtly reflects the interests of the profession, 
and contributes to the loss of social idealism. Legal education is seen as 
overwhelmingly positivist and doctrinal (thus separating the law in student’s minds 
from its social context and discouraging significant critique of these laws), or focused 
primarily on legal skills (at the expense of theoretical and critical discussions, which, 
again, might challenge the neutrality of the law).18 As a result, the law is presented as 
relatively autonomous, and concerns for social justice seen as marginal or irrelevant.19 
                                                 
18 Alan Hunt, ‘The Case for Critical Legal Education’ (1986) 20 The Law Teacher 10, 11-13; Mary 
Keyes & Richard Johnstone, ‘Changing Legal Education: Rhetoric, Reality, and Prospects for the 
Future’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 537, 540; Stanley, above n 12, 82-84; Ward, above n 12, 147; 
James, ‘Expertise as Privilege’, above n 7. 
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In particular, the critical narrative suggests that the units of study required for 
admission to practice (in Australia these include Criminal Law and Procedure, Torts, 
Contracts, Property, Equity, Company Law, Administrative Law, Federal and State 
Constitutional Law, Civil Procedure, Evidence, and Professional Conduct [including 
Trust Accounting])20 most clearly demonstrate this narrow scope to the curriculum, 
and are evidence of the power of the legal profession over legal education.21 Critical 
scholars argue that these are narrow in the sense that they are firmly based on the 
more prestigious areas of private legal professional practice, do not include units that 
offer significant theoretical, critical, or contextual analyses of the social or legal 
structure (such as units on anti-discrimination, welfare, or family law), and imply that 
                                                                                                                                            
19 Tracey Booth, ‘Student Pro Bono: Developing a Public Service Ethos in the Contemporary 
Australian Law School’ (2004) 29 Alternative Law Journal 280, 281; Janet Mosher, ‘Legal Education: 
Nemesis or Ally of Social Movements?’ (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 3, 613, 625-626; Keyes 
and Johnstone, above n 18, 541; Webb, above n 1, 287; Kennedy cited in Adrienne Stone, ‘Women, 
Law School and Student Commitment to the Public Interest’ in Jeremy Cooper and Louise Trubek 
(eds), Educating for Justice: Social Values and Legal Education (1997) 56, 61; Příbáň, above n 12, 
127; Gabel and Kennedy cited in Ward, above n 12, 147. 
20 These units were developed in 1992 by the Consultative Committee of State and Territory Law 
Admitting Authorities, chaired by Justice Priestley, and constitute a nationally consistent and unified 
approach to the requirements for admission into legal practice throughout Australia. As they provide 
the basis of admission into the legal profession, they form the core of the curriculum in Australian law 
schools in some format or another. See Keyes and Johnstone, above n 18, 557. 
21 Keyes and Johnstone, above n 18, 557; Thornton, above n 7, 77. 
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legal education is supposed to act as a form of professional training.22 In addition, 
critical scholars suggest that the dominance of these units in the curriculum has a 
‘flow-on’ effect, causing all units to privilege legal rules in their content, and 
minimise contextual, theoretical, and critical analyses, and implicitly, present students 
with an image of what they must know in order to become a ‘real’ lawyer.23 
 
This narrow focus within the content of the law curriculum has led one theorist to go 
so far as to suggest that law school provides ‘ideological training for willing service in 
the hierarchies of the corporate welfare [S]tate’,24 while others argue that  
legal knowledge accumulated in a manner which is ideologically founded but 
which is denied the expression of its ideology constitutes educational 
indoctrination in the patterns of thought operated by the personnel of the legal 
hierarchy.25 
 
The ‘false consciousness’ that is reproduced within students as a result is argued to 
legitimate and perpetuate existing legal and political systems. Ultimately, this ‘false 
consciousness’ is said to lead to a dissociation between the human being and the 
                                                 
22 Hunt, above n 18, 10; Keyes and Johnstone, above n 18, 540, 544 and 557; Simpson and 
Charlesworth, above n 12, 106; Stanley, above n 12, 81; Margaret Thornton, ‘The Idea of the 
University and the Contemporary Legal Academy’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 481, 495; Thornton, 
above n 7, 77. 
23 Keyes and Johnstone, above n 18, 555; Thornton, above n 22, 495; Thornton, above n 7, 77. 
24 Kennedy cited in Stone, above n 19, 61. 
25 Stanley, above n 12, 83 [emphasis added]. 
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lawyer,26 because the social ideals and political consciousness of the student are first 
deadened, and then ‘…a proper professional, largely apolitical, consciousness [is 
imposed] in its place’.27 The ‘obsession’ that the law curriculum has ‘with the 
acontextual, the dispassionate and the analytical’28 is presented as an essential element 
of turning students into useful legal practitioners, and making them ‘think like a 
lawyer’.29 
 
B The Location of Power and the External Pressures Governing Legal Education 
 
In addition to critically examining the knowledge that students are exposed to within 
the law degree, critical legal scholars focus on the location of power, and attempt to 
identify who ‘holds’ the power exercised within and upon legal education that shapes 
the curriculum (and subsequently the legal identity) in particular ways. For most 
critical scholars, the very fact that law school maintains and reproduces the social and 
legal status quo is enough to account for the power exercised within legal education – 
power is understood as the privilege of the legal profession and other similarly 
advantaged bodies. 
 
Critical scholars often identify the strong links between the law school and the legal 
profession as evidence that legal education is (and always has been) responsive to a 
                                                 
26 Gabel cited in Ward, above n 12, 147. 
27 Halpern cited in Mosher, above n 19, 625. 
28 Cooper and Trubek, above n 1, 14. 
29 Keyes and Johnstone, above n 18, 543; Thornton, above n 7, 80. 
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professional audience, and is geared towards training students for the practice of 
law.30 There are also a wealth of legal scholars who suggest that ‘the central aim of a 
legal education is the education and training of legal practitioners’.31 Through these 
practices, the legal profession is represented as making the university subservient to it, 
exerting control over the design of the law degree, and seeking only to prepare 
students for legal practice (which critical scholars often read as ensuring that 
graduates maintain the status quo).32 Scholars also cite the compulsory units listed 
above as evidence that the law school ‘…is expected to act as an adjunct to the 
practising profession by replicating known paradigms of knowledge’.33 
 
Beyond the direct actions of legal professionals upon legal education, critical scholars 
draw attention to broader changes within the university sector that constrain 
curriculum content and innovation. The major change that is of concern to critical 
                                                 
30 Hunt, above n 18, 11; Rob Guthrie and Joseph Fernandez, ‘Law Schools in the 21st Century’ (2004) 
29 Alternative Law Journal 276, 276-277; Keyes and Johnstone, above n 18, 537, 542 and 555; 
Thornton, above n 7, 75; Tsamenyi and Clark, above n 16, 4 and 8; Andrew Goldsmith, ‘Standing at 
the Crossroads: Law Schools, Universities, Markets and the Future of Legal Scholarship’ in Fiona 
Cownie (ed), The Law School: Global Issues, Local Questions (1999) 62, 72. 
31 Guthrie and Fernandez, above n 30, 279. 
32 Keyes and Johnstone, above n 18, 542. 
33 Thornton, above n 7, 75. It is important to note that generally the term ‘practising legal profession’ 
refers to all legal practitioners, however most critical scholars usually use it to refer to the most 
financially rewarding forms of legal practice, which occupy the higher levels of the professional 
hierarchy. These include corporate or business practice, as opposed to pro bono legal work or work in 
community legal centres. 
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scholars is the influence of market pressures upon forms of higher education.34 The 
corporatisation of universities is argued to result in students becoming consumers of 
educational products, and, in the minds of university administrators, appears to justify 
amending university curricula in line with consumer demands. Critical scholars 
suggest that this causes a shift away from social issues in the curriculum, towards an 
emphasis on the doctrinal and vocational aspects of the law. These areas are 
synonymous with market interests, and are more likely to allow graduates to benefit 
from the ‘investment’ they have made in their education.35 In this sense, in the case of 
the law curriculum, the market pressures acting upon higher education are seen to 
reproduce the status quo, and more successfully ensure students (and law schools, 
who have to act on consumer demands) do not stray far from the interests of the legal 
profession.36 As such, critical scholars speculate that students are likely to see an 
engagement with critical, contextual, and theoretical curriculum content as a wasted 
educational investment, and, as a result, are likely to lose their social idealism. 
 
C Other Influences Upon the Student 
 
Finally, critical scholars have focused on other aspects of the study of law that 
impacts upon a student’s loss of idealism. In many respects, these elements are seen 
                                                 
34 Anne Bottomley, ‘Lessons From the Classroom: Some Aspects of the ‘Socio’ in ‘Legal’ Education’ 
in Philip Thomas (ed), Socio-Legal Studies (1997) 163, 180; Keyes and Johnstone, above n 18, 554 and 
548-549; Thornton, above n 22, 483; Ward, above n 12, 148. 
35 Keyes and Johnstone, above n 18, 554; Thornton, above n 22, 483; Thornton, above n 21, 76. 
36 Bottomley, above n 34, 180; Thornton, above n 7, 75-76; Ward, above n 12, 148. 
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as simply working upon the law student – as an external force or influence that 
operates on them. For example, critical scholars argue that practices such as the 
teaching and assessment methods utilised in law classrooms render students docile 
and passive objects, with lectures simply consisting of a ‘knowledge dump’ from the 
lecturer’s notes into the student’s mind, and assessment practices primarily requiring 
the uncritical regurgitation of knowledge.37 Critical scholars suggest that such 
practices leave little opportunity for students to critically examine the law, and are 
likely to make graduates believe that only small, cosmetic changes to the legal system 
(as opposed to major changes in the social and legal order) are required to improve the 
way it functions.38 
 
Critical scholars often paint the classroom experience as a negative one for law 
students (especially the idealistic ones) – as consisting of competition, adversarialism, 
                                                 
37 See for example Charlesworth, above n 12, 30; Simpson and Charlesworth, above n 12, 106; Richard 
Johnstone and Sumitra Vignaendra, Learning Outcomes and Curriculum Development in Law: A 
Report Commissioned by the Australian Universities Teaching Committee (2003) Australian 
Universities Teaching Committee [394-395 and 463]  
<http://www.autc.gov.au/projects/completed/loutcomes_law/split_pdf.htm> at 15 January 2007; 
Thornton, above n 7, 78; David Weisbrot, ‘Taking Skills Seriously’ (2004) 29 Alternative Law Journal 
266, 267; Allen and Baron, above n 1, 288; Keyes and Johnstone, above n 18, 539. 
38 Charlesworth, above n 12, 31; Simpson and Charlesworth, above n 12, 106. Furthermore, these 
criticisms of the ‘transmission’ model of teaching have been confirmed by many educational theorists. 
See for example Paul Ramsden, Learning to Teach in Higher Education (2nd edition, 2003). 
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aggressiveness, racism, classism, and sexism between them.39 The classroom is 
positioned as an environment in which students experience either sniggering from 
others, or even blatant discrimination if they attempt to discuss social justice issues.40 
Critical scholars often characterise law teachers as using esoteric terms and legal 
jargon in order to reinforce a student’s lack of confidence, discourage criticism, and 
maintain deference to the lecturer and (by extension) the legal hierarchy.41 In all, the 
arrangement of such practices is seen to maintain debate and discussion within 
specified, ‘appropriate’ boundaries, ensuring that the knowledge of the law that 
students are exposed to is controlled, and that the legal identity imposed upon them is 
one that accords with the interests of the legal profession.42 As a result, critical 
scholars argue that students are implicitly discouraged from maintaining any socially 
idealistic goals that they possessed when they began their legal education. 
 
This section has elucidated the critical legal narrative that seeks to explain why 
students that enter law school with social ideals often do not maintain such ideals 
upon graduation. Simply stated, this narrative suggests that the content of the law 
                                                 
39 Allen and Baron, above n 1, 285-286; Webb, above n 1, 287; Kevin Dolman, ‘Indigenous Lawyers: 
Success or Sacrifice?’ (1997) 4 Indigenous Law Bulletin 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ILB/1997/69.html> at 22 Feburary 2007; Heather Douglas, ‘The 
Participation of Indigenous Australians in Legal Education 1991-2000’ (2001) 24 University of New 
South Wales Law Journal <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLJ/2001/32.html> at 22 
February 2007; Keyes and Johnstone, above n 18, 542; Thornton, above n 7, 93 and 99. 
40 Thornton, above n 7, 93-94. 
41 Ibid 92. 
42 Dolman, above n 39; Douglas, above n 39; Thornton, above n 7, 91, 93 and 104. 
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degree constitutes a form of ideological indoctrination, carried out in the interests of 
the legal profession who hold power over legal education (and therefore law students), 
and seek to produce law graduates in their own image. Other practices of legal 
education operate to ‘ensure’ that students are not exposed to discussions of social 
justice, or are unable to express such concerns in the classroom. Critical scholars see 
these practices and power relations as contributing to the loss of social idealism 
among students. They are discouraged from attempting to fundamentally undermine 
and challenge the legal and social status quo, which they may have originally sought 
to do, and are instead to seek only minimal improvements to the system as it exists. 
As Klare states, students 
learn that the only lawyer-like way to view the world is moderately, through 
the window of moderate conservatism or liberal reformism.  They learn that the 
only lawyer-like way to think about social change is in terms of atomised, 
marginal, incremental reform through governmental regulation of private 
conduct…Finally, they learn that lawyers do not possess intellectual skills and 
preoccupations appropriate to discussion and analysis of fundamental issues of 
social and political organisation and thoroughgoing social change.43 
 
This narrative has been useful in bringing to light some of the power relations that are 
inherent within the teaching of law, and scholarly analyses adopting and building 
upon aspects of this narrative are widespread. The critical narrative has demonstrated 
the links between the legal profession and the content of the law curriculum, pointed 
to the effects of the increase of market values within the higher education sector on 
                                                 
43 Cited in Mosher, above n 19, 626 [emphasis in original]. 
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law students, and identified the range of practices in the law school that governs 
student behaviour and influences the content that is taught. It has also caused (some) 
legal educators to reconsider the effect of what they teach on the student’s identity. In 
this sense, the critical narrative provides a firm starting point for any further analysis 
of power relations in legal education. 
 
However, political actions initiated on the basis of this narrative have not resulted in 
broad social or political change, nor the maintenance of social ideals by students.44 
This narrative implies that if only the legal profession did not have such a tight grip 
over the content of the law curriculum; if only the teaching methodologies fostered 
reflection and incorporated appropriate pedagogical practice into their construction; if 
only law students could see through the ideological haze that clouds their vision and 
allow the light of the ‘truth’ about the law to shine forth, then their ‘real’ nature as 
socially active legal professionals would be allowed to express itself and they would 
actively engage in campaigning for social justice. On this basis, political actions such 
as the introduction of critical perspectives on the law into the curriculum, attempts to 
resist the corporatisation of universities, proposals to reduce the influence of the legal 
profession over legal education, and the introduction of pedagogically sound teaching 
and assessment techniques, appear appropriate and necessary. 
 
As reasonable as some of these observations about legal education might be, this 
paper argues that the assumptions about power, knowledge, and the subject that 
                                                 
44 See Schlag, above n 7, 204-209. As evidenced by the recent studies cited above, it appears that legal 
education continues to have ‘deleterious effects’ upon students. 
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underpin these observations (and subsequent proposals about how legal education 
might be altered) are problematic, and that this is one uninvestigated reason that this 
narrative has not been entirely successful in initiating change. The following section 
will bring Foucault’s conceptual tools of knowledge, power and the subject to bear on 
the critical narrative, in order to think differently about this narrative, and provide a 
basis for more effective analyses of, and interventions into, legal education. 
 
III LOOKING DIFFERENTLY AT THE CRITICAL LEGAL NARRATIVE 
 
Although there are many different ways with which to organise and understand his 
work, Foucault states that the objective of his various studies into madness, medicine, 
knowledge, disciplinary power, and sexuality is to examine ‘…the different modes by 
which… human beings are made subjects’ throughout history.45 When using the term 
‘subject’, Foucault is referring to a person being ‘…subject to someone else by 
control and dependence’ as well as being ‘…tied to [one’s] own identity by a 
conscience or self-knowledge’.46 In many respects, his concern is with the way in 
which people are governed, and he generally examines this in three ways – by looking 
at relations of knowledge, relations of power, and relations to the self. His work on 
knowledge, power, and the self are the main conceptual tools that will be used here to 
unpack the critical narrative. 
 
                                                 
45 Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ in James Faubion (ed), Power: Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984: Volume 3 (2000) 326. 
46 Ibid 331. 
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In brief, by bringing Foucault’s work to bear on the critical legal narrative, this 
section will demonstrate a number of untenable assumptions underpinning this 
narrative. By arguing that legal education is a form of ideological indoctrination that 
operates to repress a student’s ‘real’ interests, the critical narrative makes assumptions 
about the relationship between power and knowledge that Foucault suggests are not 
historically defensible. Additionally, by suggesting that the legal profession has the 
content of legal education (and thus the thoughts and actions of law students) in its 
grip, this narrative adopts a repressive and proprietary notion of power that differs to 
Foucault’s emphasis on the widespread, productive, and relational aspects of power. 
Finally, by seeing the practices and relations of legal education as primarily operating 
upon students, the critical narrative makes very little room for the active agency of 
students in constructing their legal identity, which Foucault suggests leads to an 
incomplete picture of modern forms of power. Each of these arguments will be 
expanded upon below. 
 
A Discourse, Ideology, and the Critical Legal Narrative 
 
Instead of adopting the belief that one can distinguish between true and false bodies of 
knowledge, and that true knowledge has a firm basis in science, Foucault seeks to 
examine how truths, particularly those that tell humans ‘who’ and ‘what’ they are, 
have been historically constructed and positioned so as to have an effect on our lives. 
In particular, Foucault analyses bodies of knowledge – what he terms discourses – and 
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the forms of truth that they put forward, from an historical perspective.47 In doing so, 
he demonstrates that what we take as ‘true’ can change over time, often based on 
seemingly insignificant historical circumstances, and not simply because people gain 
a more scientifically rigorous grasp of the ‘truth’. As such, Foucault is suspicious of 
the claim that one can achieve an objective and neutral truth. 
 
Instead of trying to determine whether discourses are objectively valid or invalid, 
Foucault urges us to consider the way a particular discourse operates. Discourses are 
‘the group of statements that belong to a single system of formation’.48 The statements 
that are grouped together within discourses are formed through unwritten rules and 
power relations, and offer what we generally understand to be ‘truths’ about the 
objects they relate to. As a whole, discourses provide coherent ways of understanding 
the world.49 However, none can gain a purchase on a neutral truth. Ways of knowing 
and representing the world can only exist as a result of the claims to truth produced by 
competing discourses that seek to establish themselves as ‘The Truth’, while 
dismissing other discourses, and their truth-claims, as untrue, unscientific, or less 
rigorous.50 
 
                                                 
47 Michel Foucault, History of Madness (2006); Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An 
Archaeology of Medical Perception (2003); Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (2002). 
48 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (2002) 121. 
49 Mills, above n 11, 53. 
50 Gavin Kendall and Gary Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods (1999) 35-41; O’Farrell, above n 11, 
81. 
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Foucault is primarily concerned with those discourses that claim to know the truth 
about people (generally the human sciences of pedagogy, criminology, and 
psychology) because of the power that they can exercise. These discourses allow 
people to understand themselves, and relate to others in particular ways. For example, 
discourses on madness allow people to position themselves as ‘mad’ or ‘sane’, while 
educational discourses do the same for ‘learners’ and ‘teachers’.51 In this sense, a 
person’s understanding of, and relation to, their very self is only produced through 
piecemeal and contingent discourses. In addition, Foucault observes that these bodies 
of knowledge have a complex relationship to power – relations of power allow for 
bodies of knowledge to be produced, and these bodies of knowledge can form the 
basis of new techniques of power and methods of governing (power will be discussed 
further below).52 
                                                 
51 This even extends to the recognition of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ teachers, or ‘slow’, ‘fast’, ‘active’, or 
‘passive’ learners. See Kendall and Wickham, above n 50, 27. 
52 As Foucault states, ‘it is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, [and] it is 
impossible for knowledge not to engender power’. See Michel Foucault, ‘Prison Talk’ in Colin Gordon 
(ed), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (1980) 37, 52. This does 
not imply a conspiracy on the part of power to only produce knowledge that can operate in its own 
interests and to further those interests. Rather, it is only through relations of power that discourses are 
able to produce new objects of knowledge, and that the truth about these objects can be ‘known’. See 
Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’ in Colin Gordon (ed), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings 1972-1977 (1980) 78, 102. People within institutions such as schools or prisons become 
objects that can be known through forms of observation exercised upon them, and this knowledge can 
then be used to implement further power relations to govern them as individuals, or can be collated and 
used as the basis of entire ‘disciplines’ such as criminology and pedagogy, which can lead to the 
government of larger populations. For example, knowledge of a person’s skills and attributes gained 
  25 
 
On the basis of this understanding of discourse, some of the assumptions of the 
critical narrative, and its claims that legal education constitutes a form of ideological 
indoctrination that represses a student’s ‘real’ interests, can be considered 
differently.53 A central assumption of this narrative is that a person’s actual interests 
are different from what that person consciously perceives them to be, and, if 
repressive relations were removed, then the ideologically indoctrinated would see 
their interests as different to those imposed upon them.54 
 
The notion of ideology employed here posits that a universal human subject exists and 
potentially has access to a transcendental truth about the world and what their own 
interests are, if only social institutions did not impose ideological constructions upon 
them, or cause them to develop a false consciousness.55 In this sense, the critical 
narrative assumes that there exists a pre-given human subject possessing a 
                                                                                                                                            
through assessment practices allows for them to be more effectively governed through targeted 
educational interventions, while knowledge of the skills held by a group of people can allow for 
standards of ‘normal’ development and achievement to be determined, that can allow for ‘appropriate’ 
government to be undertaken. See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 
(1991) 251 and 254. 
53 It is important to note that, despite the popular confusion on this score, the notions of ‘ideology’ and 
Foucaultian ‘discourse’ are not equivalent. 
54 David Hoy, ‘Power, Repression, Progress: Foucault, Lukes, and the Frankfurt School’ in David Hoy 
(ed), Foucault: A Critical Reader (1986) 123, 125. 
55 O’Farrell, above n 11, 98. 
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consciousness that power subsequently seizes and acts upon.56 In addition, this 
narrative suggests that this pre-given human subject has ‘real’ interests, and if these 
‘real’ interests are not allowed expression, they have been repressed. From this 
perspective, ideology is seen as a negative element through which ‘…the knowledge 
relation, is disturbed, obscured, veiled by the conditions of existence, social relations, 
or the political forms imposed on the subject from the outside’.57 
 
However, if, as Foucault suggests, the coherent and systematic structures of ideas with 
which people understand the world as well as themselves are only made available to 
them through discourses, then it is untenable to propose that there is a point at which a 
human subject can access an entirely valid and neutral understanding of the world. It 
is problematic to suggest that there is a point at which one may fully express their 
‘real’ interests, prior to the repression of these interests as ideological relations 
subsequently blanket a person in layers of falsity. Instead, from the very outset, 
discourses have a role in shaping subjects – even in shaping what they take to be their 
true, real, or authentic selves. Political and economic conditions cannot be a veil for 
subjects – instead they are central elements in the formation of kinds of subjectivity.58 
                                                 
56 Michel Foucault, ‘Body/Power’ in Colin Gordon (ed), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings 1972-1977 (1980) 55, 58; Michel Foucault, ‘Truth and Power’ in Colin Gordon (ed), 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (1980) 109, 118. 
57 Foucault cited in O’Farrell, above n 11, 98. 
58 Michel Foucault, ‘Truth and Juridical Forms’ in James Faubion (ed), Power: Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984: Volume 3 (2000) 1, 15; Michel Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self’ in Paul 
Rabinow (ed), Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984: Volume 1 
(2000) 223, 225. 
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Indeed, the very idea of an ‘identity’ is itself an object of knowledge produced 
through discourses – it is not a concept that is historically stable enough to suggest it 
can be ‘repressed’, or even ‘liberated’.59 
 
Additionally, the notion of ideology underpinning this critical narrative assumes that 
the knowledge provided to students is false – as evidenced by terms such as ‘false 
consciousness’ – and that it is somehow possible to access a ‘true consciousness’.60 
This is closely related to the idea that a person’s ‘real’ interests are repressed, because 
it is assumed that only a ‘false’ ideological knowledge could obscure these real 
interests to the advantage of a group or person exerting unwarranted influence. This 
notion of ideology is a remnant of Marxian influences on critical legal scholarship, 
and refers to statements or ideas produced by or within institutions and imposed on 
people in some form so as to influence their thoughts and actions.61 As Mills states,62 
it usually describes 
the means whereby oppressed people accept views of the world which are not 
accurate and which are not in their interests.  Ideology…is the imaginary 
                                                 
59 This analysis of the assumptions underpinning the use of the concept of ideology within the critical 
legal narrative is not to suggest that students do not experience feelings like alienation and silencing, 
nor is it to suggest that students do not feel passionate about social justice and possess their own desires 
regarding what they hope to do with their legal education upon graduation. Rather, it is to point out that 
it is potentially dangerous to posit that these are ‘real’ or ‘natural’ interests, and that it is not easy to 
suggest that these interests are ‘repressed’. 
60 Hoy, above n 54, 131. 
61 Mills, above n 11, 54. 
62 Ibid 34 [emphases added]. 
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representation of the way things are in a society, and this fictive version of the 
world serves the interests of those who are dominant in society. 
 
Thus, ideology suggests the existence of ‘true’ and ‘false’ knowledge, and thereby 
posits that objects exist in the world independently of the ability of people to represent 
them through discourses.63 In doing this, the notion of ideology also maintains that 
knowledge and power are mutually exclusive; that true knowledge is disinterested, 
can only exist removed from the distortions of power, and that relations of power can 
only create false knowledge – a claim that is problematic in light of the relationships 
between power and knowledge mentioned above.64 
 
With regard to legal education, the critical narrative assumes that there is a truth and 
falsity about the law that students can be taught. As Foucault states, ideology ‘stands 
in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth’, and thus 
the notion of ideology is inconsistent with his intention to see ‘historically how effects 
of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false’ 
but are produced through relations of power and knowledge.65 As such, all discourses 
employ relations of power to produce different ‘truths’ (as well as different 
‘falsehoods’), and therefore the knowledge about the law and society that students are 
provided with cannot be categorised as inherently true or false. Coupled with the 
recognition that forms of identity are not the products of a person’s consciousness but 
                                                 
63 O’Farrell, above n 11, 98. 
64 Hoy, above n 54, 131. 
65 Foucault ‘Truth and Power’, above n 56, 118. 
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produced through discourses, a person therefore has no ‘real’ interests to be repressed 
by ‘false’ legal ideologies. 
 
Additionally, by recognising the links between power and knowledge, it is possible to 
see that any attempts to establish a regime of truth about an object (be it in the form of 
criminology telling the truth about crime, pedagogy telling the truth about learning, 
critical scholars telling the truth about power, or psychologists telling the truth about 
our personalities) are underpinned by power relations, and have further effects of 
power.66 In this sense, those advocating change on the basis of a critical analysis of 
social relations are not, as is often assumed, speaking from a transcendental position, 
liberated from relations of power because they are able to identify them.67 The subject 
position of the critical legal scholar is one created by relations of power and 
knowledge, and one that engenders further effects of power. Furthermore, the social 
idealism of students is an object of knowledge produced through critical discourses, 
allowing critical scholars to ‘know’ students and make political claims about legal 
education.68 Political claims suggesting that it is possible to ‘liberate’ people from 
their false consciousness, made by a subject claiming to speak the truth about that 
                                                 
66 Mills, above n 11, 69. 
67 Hoy, above n 54, 138. 
68 Of course, this is not to suggest that students do not lose their social idealism, but rather to point out 
that this can only be understood and ‘known’ as an object of knowledge constructed through critical 
discourses. 
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consciousness, are contentious, and only likely to lead to different relations of 
power.69 
 
The idea that one can progress from a form of ideological indoctrination towards a 
true knowledge is implicit within attempts to institute a critical legal education. A 
critical legal education, in which critical, theoretical, and contextual analyses of the 
law become the dominant focus of the curriculum, is often suggested to be a way in 
which critical legal academics can ‘free’ students from the ‘false consciousness’ 
imposed upon them through a traditional doctrinal and vocationally focused legal 
education. Although those suggesting that legal education become a critical one will 
often say that one ideology must not be substituted for another in this process,70 the 
assumption that underpins such political action is that students can be taught a ‘truer’ 
knowledge about the law and be removed from the negative power relations that 
impose this ideology upon them. Additionally, by engaging with different discourses 
through their legal education, students are simply taking up a different position in 
relation to different discourses. For example, they may be adopting the position of the 
‘socially just and responsible legal graduate’ instead of that of a ‘legal professional’. 
In both instances, the legal identity is produced through discourses and power 
relations – none of which is more true or false than another. 
 
B Foucault, Power, and the Critical Legal Narrative 
                                                 
69 Michel Foucault, ‘Schizo-Culture: Infantile Sexuality’ in Sylvère Lotringer (ed), Foucault Live: 
Collected Interviews, 1961-1984 (1996) 154, 160. 
70 See for example Fitzpatrick and Hunt, above n 12; Hunt, above n 12. 
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The critical legal narrative is centrally concerned with power in legal education. Many 
approaches to understanding power, including those underpinning the critical legal 
narrative, focus on it being ‘held’ by ‘powerful’ groups, such as the ‘ruling class’ or 
the legal profession, and represented in the actions of overarching structures such as 
the ‘State’, the economy, or even institutions such as legal education. In such 
formulations, power is seen as an essentially repressive force, acting to exclude, 
forbid, limit, censor, or say no. Those upon whom this power is exercised must submit 
to it, obey its dictates, endure repression, and often experience the imposition of a 
false consciousness.71 As power is seen to be ‘held’, this line of thinking suggests that 
it therefore represents an individual or collective ‘will’, inevitably involving the 
domination of one group over another, such as by the legal profession over students in 
the case of legal education,72 aimed at oppressing or dominating these groups, or 
denying their ‘true’ human nature in the interests of the powerful.73 The corollary of 
this understanding of power is that political activists must ‘gain’ power, remove 
                                                 
71 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume 1 (1998), 82-85; Michel 
Foucault, ‘Power Affects The Body’ in Sylvère Lotringer (ed), Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 
1961-1984 (1996) 207, 207 and 210; Michel Foucault, ‘Questions on Geography’ in Colin Gordon 
(ed), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (1980) 63, 72; Foucault 
‘Two Lectures’, above n 52, 90; Mitchell Dean, Governing Societies: Political Perspectives on 
Domestic and International Rule (2007) 47. 
72 Foucault ‘Will to Knowledge’, above n 71, 92; Foucault ‘Power Affects the Body’, above n 71, 210. 
73 Foucault ‘Will to Knowledge’, above n 71, 82-85; Foucault ‘Power Affects the Body’, above n 71, 
207 and 210; Foucault ‘Questions on Geography’, above n 71, 72; Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, above n 
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negative social relations, and progress towards total individual freedom, allowing for 
the full expression of human nature. 
 
Much of Foucault’s work is concerned with analysing power relations in different 
contexts.74 Despite his formulation of power changing depending on the context of his 
analysis, each formulation maintains common elements. Overall, he finds the 
dominant conception of power, outlined above, inadequate for his own purposes, and 
suggests more effective ways of approaching power. In particular, he seeks to move 
away from restrictive views that see power as enshrined in the actions of the State, the 
economy, or as representative of class interests. He prefers to examine the mundane 
techniques through which power is exercised. In addition, he does not see power as a 
force that can be ‘possessed’ by some and denied to others who are repressed by it, 
but as a productive social relationship that is constantly modifiable. Each of these 
elements will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
To begin with, when analysing power, Foucault does not focus on grand and abstract 
concepts, such as the State or the economy, because he believes they are too unwieldy 
                                                 
74 See for example, Foucault ‘Discipline and Punish’, above n 52; Foucault ‘Will to Knowledge’, above 
n 71; Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978 
(2007); Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979 
(2008); Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality Volume 2 (1990); Michel 
Foucault, The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality Volume 3 (1988). In these studies, Foucault 
examines disciplinary forms of power, power as it is applied to the body, and relations of power 
exercised over populations. 
  33 
to be effective in this task, and they fail to demonstrate the more mundane and 
specific practices through which power is exercised. These mundane practices include 
daily interactions between teachers and students within the classroom, techniques of 
medical practice, and those mechanisms and techniques involved in projects of self-
discovery and liberation that are underpinned by psychological discourses, none of 
which can be said to be directed by the State or the ruling class, but nevertheless still 
govern conduct.75 In addition, focusing on the State does not allow one to identify the 
numerous points at which power can be blocked or resisted, which may also be central 
to its operation.76 A focus on the micro practices through which power is exercised – 
that is, ‘…the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches 
their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning 
processes and everyday lives…’77 – may allow for a more nuanced and effective 
understanding of power.78 In fact, these more mundane practices may very well be 
essential if objects such as ‘the State’ are to successfully govern.79 
 
If power is examined by focusing on these mundane practices, then it cannot easily be 
seen as something that represents the interests of one group in the last instance, nor as 
                                                 
75 Foucault ‘Power Affects the Body’, above n 71, 210; Dean, above n 71, 47; Mitchell Dean, Critical 
and Effective Histories: Foucault’s Methods and Historical Sociology (1994) 151-152; Nikolas Rose, 
Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self (1990). 
76 Foucault ‘Power Affects the Body’, above n 71, 210. 
77 Foucault ‘Prison Talk’, above n 52, 39. 
78 Foucault ‘Discipline and Punish, above n 52, 26; Foucault ‘Two Lectures’, above n 52, 96-97. 
79 Foucault ‘Will to Knowledge’, above n 71, 92; Foucault ‘Power Affects the Body’, above n 71, 210; 
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something imposed on others. Instead, it can be recognised as a series of complex 
relations that can operate in an unpredictable manner. In this sense, power must be 
seen as intentional, but nonsubjective80 – that is, the operation of power does not 
emanate from a central point, nor does it originate in a single conscious will, and it 
cannot be explained with reference to the intentions of various decision-makers or 
‘powerful’ people.81 Furthermore, there are numerous historical contingencies that 
may explain the existence of one particular set of power relations. Power relations do 
not gain their intelligibility simply by looking at whom they advantage. 
 
The suggestions that power is ‘held’ by some, and the desire to ascribe some measure 
of conspiratorial intent to power relations in law schools, feature as part of the critical 
narrative. In some cases, critical scholars suggest that the legal profession and legal 
academics ‘hold’ power and exercise it upon students to repress their ‘real’ interests. 
For example, some feminist critical scholars82 suggest that the power to define the 
‘normal’ law student, against which others are implicitly compared, is held by 
‘benchmark men’, and exercised so as to maintain their own privilege. While it is 
often the case that power relations can become relatively stable, or even ‘frozen’ in 
some instances (to the advantage of a few people or groups), it is not always the case 
                                                 
80 Foucault ‘Will to Knowledge’, above n 71, 92 and 94; Foucault ‘Power Affects the Body’, above n 
71, 210. 
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that a group ‘holds’ the power to do this – it could be the result of a range of other 
practices. In other cases, critical scholars suggest that particular teaching or 
assessment practices in legal education are implemented simply because of the desire 
of the legal profession. For example critical scholars have argued that teaching 
methods such as the law lecture or the Socratic method of teaching, and assessment 
techniques such as closed-book examinations, are utilised because they often result in 
students becoming passive, uncritical, and unreflective.83 This does not recognise that 
other factors, such as resourcing issues, influence the decision to use a particular 
teaching methodology in the classroom.84 Any cynicism and loss of idealism that 
students develop cannot simply be reduced to an effect of the legal profession’s desire 
to produce legal professionals in its own image. In addition, using a traditional 
conception of power, the critical narrative cannot adequately account for the 
proliferation of new teaching and assessment techniques within the law school, 
particularly those that seek to encourage students to be reflective. Of course, 
encouraging critical scholars to focus on the mundane techniques of power is not to 
suggest that groups such as the legal profession have no influence over the power 
relations of legal education. Rather it is to allow critical scholars to recognise the 
complexity to these power relations, and the multiple historical contingencies upon 
which their use is based, with the ultimate hope of providing a more nuanced and 
effective understanding of power. 
 
                                                 
83 Ibid 78; Charlesworth, above n 12, 30; Simpson and Charlesworth, above n 12,106. 
84 See further Johnstone and Vignaendra, above n 37, 322-326; Barbara Kamler, ‘Text as Body/Body as 
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If power is to be analysed at its micro level, and seen as a social relationship, then one 
must also account for the possibility that power relations may be modified or even 
reversed by those involved.85 At any point at which power is exercised it can 
experience some form of agonism.86 This agonism is not simply characterised by 
someone saying ‘no’ to power, and it may not result in a total overhaul of that 
relation, but it may make it less effective, or alter it in some way.87 In contrast to 
common understandings of power, this approach recognises that one’s freedom and 
autonomy are essential features in the operation of power – it is only if one has a 
degree of freedom that they are able to act in response to power and in fact have 
power operate upon them. As Foucault suggests, power is the ability ‘…to structure 
the possible field of action of others’,88 and ‘…is exercised only over free subjects, 
and only insofar as they are ‘free’’.89 A person or group exercises power when it is 
able to set limits upon and constrain, or conversely encourage in specific ways, the 
conduct of another person or group, who themselves have varying degrees of freedom 
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within these power relations to take certain courses of action.90 If a person does not 
have any measure of freedom whatsoever, then Foucault suggests that they are subject 
to a state of domination, not a power relation. Power, then, has the potential to 
circulate, and operates as a relationship between people. It does not remain the 
privileged property of one individual or group – in fact people are not just points upon 
which power operates, but are also vehicles through which it is transmitted.91 
 
In many respects, the critical narrative cannot account for the resistance that is 
exercised as part of power relations. For example, students can exercise resistance by 
not listening to what they are taught, or even by leaving a lecture. They can demand to 
be taught ‘relevant’ content, shift in their chairs, stop taking notes if they lose interest, 
or even avoid studying entire elective units. These are techniques through which 
students are resisting the exercise of power by academics, and often require teachers 
to modify their own actions. However, critical scholars do not see these as forms of 
resistance, particularly because these practices are not aimed at overturning power 
relations and liberating students. In addition, because of the existence of resistance 
within power relations, the strong links between the legal profession and the law 
school do not determine in any way that a professional identity is imposed upon 
students. Although it is not possible to remove people from power relations, it is 
possible to act within them and alter them in original ways. Power within legal 
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education is not monolithic, and nor does it operate upon students – it is piecemeal, 
complex, modifiable, and operates through students. 
 
As mentioned above, an effective way of looking at power relations is to see them as 
productive and not negative or repressive. Foucault believes that ‘…power would be a 
fragile thing if its only function were to repress…exercising itself in a negative 
way’,92 and instead suggests that power is ‘…bent on generating forces, making them 
grow, and ordering them, rather than…dedicated to impeding them, making them 
submit, or destroying them’.93 This productive notion of power is related to his 
eschewal of the idea that a true human nature exists that can be discovered through the 
human sciences. As truths about human nature are historically contingent and 
constructed through discourse, then there can be no ‘true’ nature to repress and no 
‘false’ consciousness to impose.94 On this basis, instead of assuming that the forms of 
‘consciousness’ provided by power are negative and imposed, it is much more 
effective and politically tenable to consider what forms of ‘consciousness’ these 
power relations have created, or allowed to come into being. As Foucault suggests,  
[w]e must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative 
terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it 
‘conceals’.  In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of 
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objects and rituals of truth.  The individual and the knowledge that may be 
gained of him [sic] belong to this production.95 
 
Techniques for accumulating knowledge, mechanisms that allow for observation, 
behaviours and modes of action, cultural relations, and even identities, are all 
produced through power relations.96 
 
It is this productive aspect of power that the critical narrative does not easily 
recognise. As we have seen, the critical narrative suggests that teaching methods such 
as the Socratic Method are adopted so as to exclude some forms of knowledge that 
students hold, minimise contextual discussions, and produce uncritical and 
unreflective black-letter lawyers.97 However, if considered as a technique of power, 
this practice can be understood as productive, in the sense that it produces students 
able to defend a particular statement despite rigorous questioning, and instantly 
respond to a line of argument. Through this technique, students can develop the ability 
to know how to argue a point of law and defend a position, producing a legal identity 
with the ‘…analytic, oral and adversarial skills [they can use] in the future’.98 In 
addition, the power relations within legal education that produce professional and 
vocationally skilled legal identities lacking social idealism are generally characterised 
by critical scholars as negative, repressive, and imposed. One example is the constant 
                                                 
95 Foucault ‘Discipline and Punish’, above n 52, 194. 
96 Mills, above n 11, 36; O’Farrell, above n 11, 100-101. 
97 Thornton, above n 7, 78. 
98 Kamler, above n 84, 376-377. 
  40 
criticism of professional and masculine norms that are present or implicit within the 
law curriculum. Although these norms may inform particular practices of power and 
may operate to the advantage of some, they are rarely seen as productive – in 
particular, they can produce useful forms of identity that are able to function within 
the legal system (such as skilled professionals, or lawyers who ‘know’ the law). Of 
course, this is not to suggest that they cannot or should not be altered. Rather, it is to 
point out that they do not simply exist or operate conspiratorially in order to repress 
some and advantage others. 
 
As Foucault suggests, power is not possessed by any single individual or group, and 
does not represent their interests or embody their whims. Instead, power relations are 
complex relations that can be resisted and altered. They do not create false knowledge 
that ‘blinds’ people to the reality of the world, but produce different kinds of 
knowledge, and are central in the production of modalities of identity. Therefore, 
Foucault’s alternative way of thinking about power relations is clearly central to 
interrogating the assumptions that underpin the critical narrative. 
 
C Foucault, the Subject, and the Critical Legal Narrative 
 
The final aspect of Foucault’s thought that can be used to unpack the critical legal 
narrative is his work on the subject, and his investigations into the ways in which 
people govern themselves and construct their own identities. As mentioned earlier, 
Foucault uses the term ‘subject’ in two senses: to refer to one who is ‘…subject to 
someone else by control and dependence, and tied to [one’s] own identity by a 
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conscience or self-knowledge’.99 Foucault’s work on the subject grew out of his 
analyses of power relations, and the importance he places on agonism or resistance as 
a central element of these relations. This resistance is a result of people being 
relatively free to act within the constraints of power relations. Despite the constraints 
that power relations define, this degree of freedom means that people are not simply 
the objects upon which power relations operate, but subjects of those power relations 
as well.100 The possibility that people can act within these power relations to resist 
and modify them also means that they can potentially alter the way that power 
operates upon them to govern their identities. The active agency and freedom of 
people within power relations is not something that the critical legal narrative easily 
recognises, or comfortably allows for. 
 
Traditional philosophical and political thought on the subject suggests that people 
possess an essential and ‘true’ human nature, and that the individual is a pre-given, 
universal, transcendental, and objective reference point for all social action, 
knowledge, and meaning.101 As discussed above, critical legal thought adopts this 
understanding of the subject by positing a human nature repressed by power. In 
addition, critical thought sees power operating upon people, and that the self is largely 
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a reflection of the dominant patterns, relations, and interactions of a society.102 This 
leaves very little room for the recognition that people play an active role in these 
relations, and nor does it allow for the possibility that the self may not only transmit 
power relations, but also be a site of their resistance and reversal. 
 
In contrast, Foucault does not take ‘…the founding or constitutive subject of 
philosophical humanism’ as objectively given.103 He suggests that this understanding 
of the subject is historically untenable, and argues that we must remove the subject 
from its Modernist sovereignty as the originator of all social action and meaning. This 
particularly Western approach has only been made available to these populations 
because of the existence of Christianity, and the practices of pastoral guidance, 
spiritual discipline, and techniques of self-examination developed therein.104 
According to Foucault, our current understanding of the self ‘…is nothing else than 
the historical correlation of the technology built into our history’.105 As such, the 
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‘self’ is not an objective reality, nor an unproblematic object of study – rather it is a 
historically contingent object of knowledge.106 
 
Foucault demonstrates his argument by pointing to the understanding of the self that 
existed in Ancient Greece. According to Foucault, in Ancient Greek society, the ‘self’ 
was not something that people were to discover the truth of, renounce, or alternatively 
liberate. Rather, it was an end in itself – something that people were to continually 
work on and ‘take care of’, constantly constructing and reconstructing their own mode 
of ‘being’ or ‘living’.107 In the first few centuries CE, this way of understanding the 
self changed. Christian practices of self-examination and confession began to develop, 
and were initially utilised as methods through which people could examine their 
‘desires of the flesh’, with the ultimate goal being the decipherment and renunciation 
of these desires.108 As it was assumed that people had a truth that they could discover 
through forms of introspection and self-examination, and with the spread of these 
practices beyond the church, the idea that people had a ‘deep’ or ‘true’ self 
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emerged.109 Although this latter concept of the self dominates in our culture, 
Foucault’s point is that other relations to the self have existed, and are possible. 
 
Although their end goal may have changed, many of the practices invented through 
which people were encouraged to work on themselves are still employed in a variety 
of fields today. These include the practices through which one maintains their 
physical health and body, keeps a journal of reflections, accepts forms of self-restraint 
or abstinence, and undertakes self-reflection to ensure one is achieving one’s goals.110 
Foucault suggests that these practices are central in the exercise of power and in the 
construction of forms of identity, and refers to them as ‘technologies of the self’, in 
the sense that the term technology generally denotes the tools used in the construction, 
production, or operation of something.111 These practices are usually suggested and 
held out to people by the culture, social group, or institution in which they are part 
and 
…permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a 
certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, 
and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state 
of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.112 
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The primary purpose of these practices is to allow subjects to construct their identities 
in ways that will enable them to interact successfully within their culture, social 
group, or institution.113 
 
In addition to specific techniques, a person’s relationship to various truths is also a 
central part of the construction of forms of identity. In giving shape to the modern 
self, people often rely on discourses and bodies of knowledge that have the status of 
‘truth’ and which offer people a ‘true’ understanding of themselves, such as 
psychology. These truths inevitably result in effects of power, as they are utilised by 
people in exercising power over themselves, or used by those exercising power over 
people on a broader scale. Additionally, people are often encouraged to adopt 
practices that allow them to grasp or access their own truth and use this self-
knowledge to shape the construction of their own identity. Examples of these 
practices, wherein a person constructs themselves as an object of knowledge for 
themselves, include techniques of confession that encourage people to state the ‘truth’ 
about themselves (particularly the form of their own faults and desires), and change 
their actions on the basis of such a truth.114 
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In all, Foucault argues that the formation of identity is partly constructed through 
specific techniques that have been adopted and put into practice by the subject 
themselves, relations between the person and truth, and power relations that operate 
upon people. As such, the subject must not be considered a substance, but a form: it 
‘…is never given to itself, but formed, organised, shaped, and, indeed, dislocated 
within diverse modalities of practice’,115 and is therefore always subject to being 
‘dissolved and recreated in different configurations’.116 This perspective ‘replaces the 
commonsense notion that our identity is the product of our conscious, self-governing 
self and, instead, presents individual identity as a product of discourses… and 
institutional practices’.117 As such, it provides an important lens through which to 
examine the critical narrative. 
 
As we have already seen, the critical legal narrative suggests that law students are 
indoctrinated by ideologies, and that the legal profession and legal academics exercise 
power over students in the construction of their legal identity. The reason that 
Foucault’s work is useful in interrogating the critical narrative is because it does not 
assume a passive or docile subject upon which power operates. Critical scholars do 
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not incorporate the active agency or notions such as the freedom of those within 
relations of power to any significant extent. 
 
An example of this is the suggestion within the critical narrative that law schools are 
essentially disciplinary institutions that simply ‘write’ on the docile bodies of law 
students, so that they may ‘think like a lawyer’.118 The argument that power operates 
to indoctrinate students not only relies on the assumption that a human nature or an 
historically stable and unchanging human ‘essence’ exists to be repressed (already 
demonstrated to be untenable on a number of accounts), but also the assumption that 
power relations simply act upon people. 
 
In many cases, critical legal scholars imply that law students have ‘real’ interests, and 
these interests appear to be to address social disadvantage, ensure the protection of 
human rights, and overturn unjust structures of power in everything that they do (in 
fact, critical scholars assume these are the interests of all humans in general). Failure 
to do so implies that one is not acting authentically, and is not being true to oneself. 
This is especially so if the student is socially disadvantaged – that is, a female student, 
an Indigenous student, or one from any disadvantaged social minority. Many critical 
analyses imply that the socially disadvantaged reluctantly take on dominant norms 
when constructing their identity, against their better judgment, their own humanity, or 
the interests of their gender, race, class, or sexuality. These people are often 
understood as ‘sell-outs’ who do not fully understand their interests, or are trying to 
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forget their disadvantaged past. For example, in an analysis of law schools, feminist 
critical scholars do not discount ‘…the desire of some law students from diverse 
cultural backgrounds to be quiescent, anonymous and assimilable’, who, they argue, 
might ‘…go to law school because they wish to make a successful career in law and 
to erase any memory of perceived disadvantage as quickly as possible’.119 These 
scholars do also note that ‘…the process of transformation [may be] facilitated with 
[the student’s] consent’,120 but nevertheless still imply that such choices are made 
reluctantly, and not entirely actively. The implicit conclusion drawn is that if such 
influences were removed, law students would inevitably become politically 
engaged.121 This assumes a passive subject with real interests that is simply acted 
upon and determined by power relations. 
 
However, it is important to recognise that, following Foucault’s line of argument, 
politically conservative and socially apathetic legal identities are produced through 
active relations to the self. For example, female students who develop a ‘masculine’ 
professional identity have undertaken such a construction of their own selves, and 
have not simply been indoctrinated, nor are they necessarily doing it against their own 
wishes. As such, coupled with the use of terms such as repression and indoctrination, 
the active agency of law students in constructing their own legal identities (especially 
in a politically apathetic and non-idealistic manner) is difficult for the critical 
perspective to conceptualise and explain, let alone embrace. The active agency of 
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subjects within power relations is central, and any examination of the way in which 
the law student’s legal identity is constructed must account for the potential for 
resistant actions, and thus the production of different legal identities. Foucault’s 
understanding of the self opens up such avenues of inquiry. 
 
Recognising these notions of freedom, autonomy and resistance as central presents a 
significant development from the critical narrative. Foucault’s notion of the subject – 
and its recognition of the positive and active role that people play in constructing their 
identity through specific techniques and practices, according to particular types of 
knowledge, and for particular ends – can account for the possibility that students from 
‘disadvantaged’ backgrounds can construct ‘conservative’ legal identities and those 
from ‘advantaged’ backgrounds can construct ‘socially idealistic’ legal identities. It is 
for this reason that Foucault’s approach to the subject is useful if one is to unpack the 
critical legal narrative, and construct political actions that do not rely on its 
assumptions. People can act within power relations, be governed by them to some 
extent, yet still not be entirely determined by them. It is also important to recognise 
that power relations can be changed by something as relatively minute as changing 
one’s relation to their self – political action does not always need to be directed 
towards abstract notions such as the State or the law school as an ‘institution’. Simply 
by encouraging students to engage with different truths about legal education, 
maintain a social justice perspective in their actions, and create different, potentially 
viable, legal identities, the power relations of legal education can be directed by 
students themselves in very specific and effective ways. 
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IV CONCLUSION 
 
Many legal education scholars, motivated by the desire to understand why some law 
students, upon graduation, take jobs in corporate practice despite entering legal 
education with ‘altruistic aspirations geared toward public service’,122 have adopted a 
critical narrative to explain this process. This critical narrative suggests that law 
students are ideologically indoctrinated by the content of legal education. It is argued 
that the curriculum is composed of messages that uphold the dominance and 
advantage of the legal profession, and prevent a critical discussion of the social and 
legal status quo. The power to govern students is understood to be held by the legal 
profession, and to some extent legal academics, and exercised upon law students, 
particularly through the selection of specific teaching methods, assessment 
techniques, and classroom practices that render students as passive, uncritical vessels 
for this ideology. In the process, critical scholars argue that the law student’s real 
interests are repressed, and as a result, students develop a cynical attitude towards the 
ability of the law to achieve social change, thereby losing any social idealism they 
held when they began their legal studies. 
 
This paper has used Foucault’s work on knowledge, power, and the subject in order to 
pull apart this critical narrative, examine its underpinning assumptions, and offer a 
different way of thinking about the way law students are governed through legal 
education. Its primary focus has been laying bare these assumptions, and not with 
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developing an alternative explanation for the loss of idealism. In particular, it has 
outlined how the idea of repression through ideological indoctrination can be 
considered differently by thinking about discourses and considering these as neither 
true nor false, but having different effects of truth on people. It has also examined the 
assumption that the legal profession holds power and exercises it in a negative way 
over law students, by thinking about power as something that is exercised through 
social relations and operates in a productive manner. Finally, it has suggested that the 
subject ought not to be taken for granted as possessing an essential self, nor seen as a 
passive object that simply reflects the dictates of power, but should be understood as 
an agent that has a measure of freedom to act within the power relations that govern 
the construction of their identity. 
 
The purpose of this paper is not to argue that the critical legal narrative has been 
unproductive and useless. As discussed earlier, the critical legal narrative has been 
productive in bringing to light many of the power relations in legal education, and has 
drawn the attention of researchers to the way in which legal education has an effect on 
the construction of the legal identity. However, as this discussion has shown, the 
assumptions that underpin the arguments of many critical scholars in their analyses of 
legal education, as well as their suggestions for political action to change the situation, 
are often historically untenable, or prevent a much more nuanced and effective 
understanding of power relations that may be useful if change is to be effective. 
Without taking into account the different way of thinking about the construction of the 
legal identity that has been presented here, those hoping to alter legal education are 
unlikely to problematise certain techniques of power (such as the use of ‘neutral’ and 
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pedagogically sound techniques), may even rely on these techniques in their political 
actions, or may fail to move beyond the current understandings of the subject that 
perpetuate existing arrangements of power. If political action continually seeks to 
foster the expression of the student’s ‘real’ interests, or their own ‘truth’, then this 
political action is likely to reproduce power relations that have told us what and who 
we are. Instead of being liberatory, these truths about human nature restrict 
possibilities for new ways of relating to others, and new social forms. 
 
As such, the use of Foucault’s tools to examine the critical legal narrative has not 
been intended simply as a theoretical exercise of no real import to legal education. 
Rather, as shown here, unpacking this critical scholarship can directly contribute to 
ongoing debates about the construction of the legal identity, and refresh those debates 
in original ways. The more general absence within legal education scholarship of a 
direct concern with the power relations of legal education, coupled with the problems 
posed by the last remnants of critical approaches to power in this context, highlight 
the importance of considering the construction of the legal identity from a new angle. 
This paper provides one useful and effective perspective for doing so. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a further discussion of the way in which 
Foucault’s work (and that of others who have developed his thought) can be used in 
further analyses of legal education. As this paper has demonstrated, the critical legal 
narrative is ultimately concerned with the way in which the legal identity is governed. 
As such, one potential avenue for legal education scholarship would be to utilise 
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Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’ within future research.123 This concept offers 
an original and nuanced way of understanding how people are governed by 
institutions, other individuals, and themselves, which is based on Foucault’s work on 
knowledge, power, and the subject, and can therefore build on the groundwork 
provided in this paper. However, this is the object of future research124 – this paper 
simply seeks to open the door to such analyses within the field of legal education. 
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